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european  parLiament  l'lJ 
------------------- r=  speech  by  president  Jenkins  in  the debate on  the eur-opean  counciL  I;) 
13  december  1978  ~ 
1 weLcome  this opportunity to speak  to you  about  the outcome  of 
the ruopean  council  Last  week  in  brusseLs.  i  wiLL  not  try to 
dupLicate  herr genscher-'s  account  but  i  wouLd  Like  to put  to you 
my  view  of  tne resuLts of  the  long  hour-s  which,were  spent  on  the 
outstand1no probLems  of the setting-up of  tne eur-opean  monetar-y 
system. 
i  summed  up  my  immediate  reactions  to  tne  council  in  terms  of  its 
beino  a  Limited  success.  after a  week  has  oone  by  i  wouLd  s~1ck to 
that  ludoment.  i  put  then  and  1  do  now  equaL  stress on  both  words. 
1t was  a  success  because  the european  monetary  system  wiLL  be  set 
up  on  1  january  1979,  the date  foreseen  by  the european  counciL 
at  bremen  in  juLy.  this 1n  itseLf was  a  considerabLe  achievement. 
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within  a  period of  less  than  nine months  from  copenhagen,  and  Less  I 
than  slx months  slnce bremen,  we  sttLed the detalLs of  a  weLL  thougiti 
out  system,  which  has  been  set  up  on  a  community  basis.  a  year  ago  M 
such  a  prospect wouLd  have  seemed  unattainabLe.  1t was  ln  that senslj 
both  successfuL  and  remarkabLe.  1  t  1s most  unusuaL  for target  dates L 
to stick.  tnat aLso  1s a  considerabLe  achievement.  ~ 
----- -------~-· but  the success was  Limited  both  by  the  fact  that we  wiLL  not  have 
the  fuLL  participation  of  aLL  nine member  states ,  and  by  the 
fact  that  even  eight were  not  abLe  to make  cLear their intentions 
during  the  european  counciL.  we  were  aLL  aware  of  the  LikeLihood 
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that  the  united kingdom  wouLd,  · ct·ue  to  a  certain i-n-graned  . 
tel 
r·~  natu- l·• 
.rat.  habit,  not  feet.  abLe  to  join  in  the  proposed  scheme  from  the  r"Ja 
beginning.  however  in  the weeks  buiLding  up  to  the  finaL  decision,  ~al 
aLL  thought  that  there were  good  grounds  for  beLieving that  ireLand~~ 
and  itaLy  woudL  join.  i  certainLy hoped  that wouLd  be  so.  however 
as  we  know  weLL  both  itaLy and  ireLand 
Brus$ts. 
found  difficulties  at 
--·  ~  "  ... ·-· 
c.] 
i  shared  their disappointment,  i  beLieve  that  the community  couLd  ~J 
d
and  tshouLd  lhavke  been  more._ forthco-111in-g- on  para-llel  ai_~~  __ _'This  was  not .(::3 
ue  o  any  ac  • 
of  preparation.  there were  two  arrangements - a  speciaL  voLet  to  th\~ 
regionaL  fund  and  the  provision  of major  infrastructure  Loans,  .  t.~  ..  ~  with  a  substantiaL  degree  of  interest  subsidy which  couLd  have  been 
used  in  combination.  there was  not  probLem  about  formuLae  and  no  () 
reaL  probLem  about  shares  between  the  two  countries.  the arrange- f1 
ment,s  were  aLs  weLL  made  to suit  the  reQuirements  of  the two  gover- ~J 
nments  concerned.  the  probLem  was  that  o~ the avaiLabiLity  of  •=·1 
resourches  to transfer.  i  mus  howerver stress that  the  sums  at  r-t 
~-~  issue were  not  Large.  this out  both  ways.  there couLd  have  been  r~ 
satisfaction without  great sacrifice·  on  the~-,  ....  other hand  it was  difficuLt  to  beLieve  that  the  success or  faiLure  ·~ 
of  itaLian  or irish participation wouLd  turn  upon  such  Limited  ,. 
funds.  the essentiaL soundness  of  the  scheme  and  the  pLana  for  the 
concerted coordination  of  economies  were  more  important. 
partLy  for  this reason  i  said - perhaps at  the  time it was  regarded() 
as  a .LittLe  rash- that  i  by  no  means  excLuded  the  possibiLity 
of  itaLy and  ireLand,  on  further  consideration  deciding  to  join  ~ 
the  SCheme  on  january 1st.  yesterday,  as  thiS  ~ouse knows,  the  r1 
itaLian  government  announced  its intention  to  join  the  system  from  F 
1st  january.  i  weLcome  this courageous  decision,  which  i  beLieve  fl 
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if we  turn  from  the position  of  individuaL  member  states  to the 
generaL  nature of  the  scheme,  the  other main  aspect  of  success 
is that 
the  system  we  have  created is a  community  system.  of  course it 
cannot  be  a  complete  community  scheme  without  the  participation  of 
aLL  member  states but  we  move  forward  on  a  community  basis.  there 
will  be  certain  technicaL  difficuLties,  but  tnese  can  i  beLieve  .  . 
be  overcome.  an  intergovernmentaL  scheme  wouLd  have  been  much 
Less  satisfactory.  a  community  scheme  encourages  and  makes  easier 
the  accession  of  those who  do  not  join  at  the start. it also 
facilitates  the participation  of  those  who  are not  fuLLy  in 
,.  . 
the  scheme,  in  a  number  of  its aspects.  this means  for  exampLe  -
and  this is one  of  the  severaL  ways  in  which  the new  system is 
more  than  just  an  enlarged  snake  - that  aLthough  there  could 
cLearLy  be  no  Question  of  a  non-participatino country  benefit1no 
from  the  very  short-term credit  arangements,  eQuaLLy  a  non-par-
ticipatino member  country  of  the  community,  couLd  participate in 
the ·.cond1 tionaL  medium-term  cred1 t  fact  L1 ties. as  far as  the 
--~---------------
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short-term fact Li ties are  concerned,  what  is envisaged,  which  ·would (1 
~---------------~--- e-J  seem· to  be  sensibLe,  is that  a  country  that  did not  participate  i-, 
in  the  exchange  rate  intervention  mechan1sm  shouLd  not  benefi  ~  from  !_!1 
the  increase  in  short-term facilities avaiLabLe  and  related  directL$~~ 
to  the  setting-up  of  the  scheme,  but  wouLd  - which  is reasonabLe  - ~  .. ; 
maintain  the  same  rights as it has  previous to' the setting  up  of  •  ~ 
~-----------------------
the scheme,  and  it would  not  use  faciLities  beyond  that. non-par-
t1c1pat1ng  member  states may  aLso  join  in  the  creation  of  the  ecu 
~Y no  2o  o/o  of  ooLd  and  doLLar  reserves with  fecom  to 
provide  the  initiaL  suppLy  of  the new  unit. 
there are severaL  other ways  in  which  the 
scheme  is significantLy different  from  an  enLarged  snake. 
there is the  use  of  the  basket  formuLa  as  an  indicator of  diver-
gence.  there is the  ''presumption''  of  intervention  to correct 
such  divergence.  there is the  size of  the credit mechanismus 
avaiLabLe,  and  their division  into  14  biLLion  ecu  of  short-term 
support  and  11  biLLion  of  medium-term.  there is the  pLan  to create 
a  fuLL  european  monetary  fund  within  two  years.  there is a 
much  greater accent  on  the  convergence  of  economies. ·there is 
~-
a  transfer of  resources· on  the  scaLe  of 5  b1 LLion  ecus  of  ~··- · 
substantiaLLy subsidised  Loans  over 5  years  to the  Less  prosperous  r· 
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5--lt·.-- partic1pat1no  economies.  and  there  fs-·a -far-greater measure  of 
poLiticaL commitment  and  wiLL. 
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as  i  have  aLready  said  ~ost of  our20'  hours  of  discussion  was 
spent  sorting  out  the  finaL  detaiLs  of  the  ems  and  seeking ways 
to  include  as  many  111~mber  states  as  possib_le_ in_  the _centra~  mechani~m£5 "! 
and  ··  t  we  did not  have  sufficient  time  to discuss in  depth  aLL  the  othe,.  t:r 1 
I<  - I 
issues which  we  wouLd  have  Liked  to discuss.  agricuLture was  a 
particuLar victim  of  pressures  of  time. 
..... 
&=.:a  ,.5., 
~-J 
~4 
1 wouLdhhave  pa,.t1cuLarLy  Liked  the  eu,.opean  counciL  to have  ~~ 
come  to  some  cone Lusions  on  the  commission's  paper  on  the  rJ  .. 
common  agricuLturaL  poLicy.  though  no  firm  conclusions were  reached,~ 
1 
~'I  1  found  the  tone  of  the  discussion  and  the  general  response  reaso- ~ 
nably  encouraging.  the  commission  wiLL  on  its own  responsibility 
put  forward  price proposals  firmLy  within  the  guidelines  Laid  down  ~r:J  .  1 
1n  the  paper.  it wiLL  defend  them  equaLLy  firmLy.  the  european 
f
.:..J 
counciL  which  meets  in  mid-march  wiLL  have  the  oppo,.tunity to  .
1  pursue  these  discussions  in  more  depth.  by  then  the  commission's  •• 
detaiLed  price proposals wiLL  be  on  the  tabLe  for the different  t~ 
sectors covered  by  the  ~ap,  but  the  agricuLturaL  counciL wiLL  not  t1 
have  reached  decisions.  L) 
the  european  counciL  did  however  decide  to appoint  three wise 
men,  as  proposed  by  the  french  president,  to  consider  the  functio-
ning  and  deicision-making  procedures  of  the  community.  the  commis-
sion  has,  as  the  house  knows,  made  proposaLs  for  changes  in  de-
cision  making  machinery  in  the  so-caLLed  ''fresco''  paper  on  en-
largement.  this additional  study  wiLL  buttress  and  broaden 
0 
this work,  but it wiLL  not  interfere with  ongoing  business.  the 
3  man  committee  wiLL  operate  on  the  basis of  the  treaties and  rJ 
the  baLance  between  the cinstitutions.  they  shouLd  not  be  in  Questio~4 
t  ~ 
when  the report is presented next  october,  i  hope  that  mem  be,.  ~~ 
states wiLL  be  courageous  in  facing  up  to the impLications  fo,. 
the  future. 
i  concLude  as  i  began,  by  characterising  the  european  counciL  as 
a  Limited  success.  it had  its disappointments  - though  these 
have  subsequentLy  been  Lessened.  this  Last  european  counciL  Lack€J 
the  exhiLarating  opening  u  p  of  the new  perspectives which  was 
characteristic of  bremen.  this time  there was  a  more  artisan-Lik·.· 
•task  to be  performed.  it was  certainLy not  po,.fectLy  done,  but 
there were  some  soLid resuLts.  we  have  a  firm  basis,  a  community 
-··  .. -~  ...  - •  ••• •-- .. e••• ----·----
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basis,  on  which  to  buiLd.  the  decision  of  the  itaLian  government  ~ 
-has  aLready  served  ot  reduce  the  potentia~ danger  of  a  partiaL  ems  c3 
encouraging  the  deveLopment  of  a  two-speed  europe.  of  course it is~~ 
stiLL  a  danger  that  stiLL  Looms  as  a  threat  in  the  background.  ~ 
but  that is not new.  it has  been  with  us  for  severaL  years.  we 
can  and  must  guard  against  1 t,  for  a  two-speed  community  in  the 
face  of  enLargement  couLd  Lead  to a  three-speed europe after 
enLargement. 
the  tasks  before  us  are  as  great  as  ever.  the  opportunities 
are greater than  a  year  ago.  brusseLs  showed  that  there is no 
easy,  smooth,  effortLess  road  forward  in  europe.  whenever  we 
think  that  we  are  deceiving  ourseLves.  but  there  is a  cLear  and 
w 
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possibLe  path.  we  wouLd  be  Quite  wrong  to react  to this european  (J 
counciL  with  despondency,  and  stiLL  more  wrong  to sink  into debiLi- ~ 4  ,  .. 
tat1ng  recrimination.  the  commission  intends  to  foLLow  this  ~ 
path  and  to buiLd  on  what  we  have  achieved.  1  hope  that  parLiament  LJ 
wiLL  give it the  encouragement  to do  so,  and  give  that  encourage- (1 
ment  to member  states aLso.  L/ 